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TENSION IN THE WATERS: HOW TRI-STATE
GENERATION v. D’ANTONIO CREATES TENSION
WITH THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND THE PRIOR
APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
Ashley N. Minton*

I. INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico Supreme Court recently invoked the Public Trust
doctrine as a means to reallocate water rights in a manner inconsistent
with the traditional reallocation of water in New Mexico. 1 In Tri-State
Generation and Transmission Association, Inc., v. D’Antonio, the supreme court upheld NMSA Section 72-2-9.1,2 which provides the Office
of the State Engineer (“State Engineer”) a conduit to administratively
regulate water rights that fall outside of the adjudication process prior to
an inter se process.3 The inter se process allows any water rights owner in a
water adjudication to challenge any other defendant to establish the seniority of an individual’s water right.4 Additionally, the supreme court
held that the deprivation of an inter se process before a water right was
curtailed was not a violation of the Section XVI of the New Mexico Constitution, which mandates that water be allocated according to priority

* University New Mexico School of Law.
1. See Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n v. D’Antonio, 2012-NMSC039, ¶ 41, 289 P.3d 1232 (explaining “[y]et this court has repeatedly recognized, a
water right is a limited, usufructuary right providing only ‘a right to use a certain
amount of water to which one has claim via beneficial use.’ Water is ‘merely usufructuary; as belonging to the public; as subject to public servitudes; as incapable of full
ownership; as subject to constraints that it be used nonwastefully, reasonably, beneficially .’ ” (quoting Walker v. United States, 2007-NMSC-039, ¶ 21, 142 N.M. 45)).
2. See Tri-State Generation &Transmission Ass’n, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 32. See also
NMSA 1978, § 72-2-9.1 (2003).
3. See Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 33 (explaining that “[w]hile the statutory adjudication process serves an essential function in
the final determination of water rights, Tri-State offers no applicable support for its
proposition that water priorities can be managed by the State Engineer only after an
inter se adjudication.”).
4. Brigette Buynak, Adjudications, WATER MATTERS! 4-1, 4-5 (2010-2011) [here
inafter Adjudications] http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/Water-Matters-2013/Adjudi
cations.pdf.
371
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administration.5 By finding that the State Engineer has authority to administer water rights without an inter se process, the supreme court creates tension with the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and New
Mexico’s constitutional guarantee of the priority administration of water.6
The background section of this note highlights the conditions leading up to the Tri-State decision and then takes a deeper look into the
procedural history prior to the case reaching the supreme court. Part III
analyzes the four sections of the supreme court’s decision in Tri-State.
Part IV analyzes the tensions Tri-State creates with the Takings Clause as
well as the prior appropriation doctrine when the decision departs from
earlier precedent.7 Finally, Part V recommends that the New Mexico Legislature or the supreme court take measures to alleviate the tensions created by the Tri-State decision by providing an inter se process to
individuals who possess water rights before those rights are curtailed.
II. BACKGROUND
Article XVI, Section II of the New Mexico Constitution provides
that “priority appropriation [of water] shall give to the better right”.8 The
better right is determined by which water user has the earliest appropriation date as compared to other water users when placed in a chronological hierarchy.9 In New Mexico, the hierarchy of water rights is determined
by a formal adjudication process with the goal of identifying and recognizing all of the valid water rights held within the state and placing them
in chronological order for regulation purposes.10 The water user found to
have the earliest appropriation date has a senior right while all later appropriations are junior against the senior appropriation.11 The adjudication process in New Mexico often takes a decade or more to complete
and consists of seven phases, not all of which are relevant to this case

5. See Tri-State, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 33 (explaining that “nothing in the New
Mexico Constitution establishes a right to an inter se adjudication of priority”).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V (forbidding “private property [to] be taken for public
use, without just compensation”).
7. See generally State ex rel. Reynolds v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy
Dist., 1983-NMSC-044, ¶ 6, 99 N.M. 699 (providing that there can be no administration of water rights until parties have been provided opportunity to contest priorities
through and inter se process).
8. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
9. Susan Kelly & Carol Romero-Wirth, Water Rights Management in NM and
Along the MRG: Is AWRM Sufficient?, WATER MATTERS! 1, 2 (2013) [hereinafter
Water Rights Management] http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/water_rights_mgmt.pdf.
10. See Snow v. Abalos, 1914-NMSC-022, ¶ 22, 18 N.M. 681.
11. Water Rights Management, supra note 9, at 2.
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note.12 In the formal adjudication process, the State Engineer and the adjudication court work together to locate and join all parties with a claim
to the water source being adjudicated.13 Currently, New Mexico has 12
pending adjudications involving approximately 72,300 non-Indian claimants and 18 tribes/pueblos.14 These numbers only account for water actually in the adjudication process. New Mexico contains a large amount of
water that is awaiting the initiation of adjudication.15
The sixth phase of the adjudication process is the inter se phase,
which provides any party that the State has involved in the adjudication
an opportunity to challenge the seniority of any other involved party’s
water rights.16 A successful challenge places the water right chronologically higher than (prior to) the losing right in the challenge and definitively determines which right is senior and which is junior.17 Seniority is
important because in the event that water rights ever need to be regulated, as in periods of drought, they will be curtailed from the bottom
up.18 “By resolving the challenge of any member of a community, the
water rights are made final as against every other right, including the
State’s claim to the right.”19 Traditionally in New Mexico, the inter se
phase has been required before an individual’s water right could be
curtailed.20
Review of the water issues New Mexico experienced leading up to
the enactment of NMSA § 72-2-9.1 (the statute at issue in this case), helps
provide an understanding of what is at stake and the parties’ legal argu-

12. Adjudications, supra note 4, at 4-3 (outlining the seven phases of adjudication
as: “(1) the complaint; (2) the hydrographic survey; (3) the sub-file phase; (4) the
global issues phase; (5) the errors an omissions phase; (6) the inter se phase; and (7)
the final decree”).
13. Water Rights Management, supra note 9, at 4.
14. Water Rights Management, supra note 9, at 2.
15. See Water Rights Management, supra note 9, at 13 (establishing the potential
implications of AWRM on the pending adjudication of the Middle Rio Grande which
is expected to “involve thoughts of claimants, cost millions of dollars, and last for
decades”).
16. Water Rights Management, supra note 9, at 4-5.
17. Adjudications, supra note 4, at 4-5.
18. “Priority of appropriation shall give the better right.” N.M. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 2.
19. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
20. See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 1983NMSC-044, ¶ 6, 99 N.M. 699 (asserting “[the court] agree[s] that there can be no
administration of junior rights as against senior rights until the parties have had an
opportunity to contest priorities inter se.”).
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ments in Tri-State v. D’Antonio.21 In 1983, the United States Supreme
Court required New Mexico to pay Texas $14,000,000 for the state’s failure to comply with the Pecos River Compact.22 Additionally, New Mexico
was required to meet all future Pecos Compact obligations to Texas without fail.23 Between the years 2000 and 2003, New Mexico experienced a
steady and rapid increase in the percentage of the state facing some degree of drought,24 which created worry of potential shortfalls in the water
deliveries to Texas that are now expressly required by the United States
Supreme Court.25 Between New Mexico’s water commitments through
compacts, the severe nature of the state’s drought, the amount of
unadjudicated water, and the prolonged nature of adjudicating and administering water rights, the State could no longer ignore the tension between the demands on scarce water resources and the sheer amount of
unadjudicated water.26
In recognizing that the State was facing a severe drought with undecided water rights and competing needs for water, the New Mexico Legislature (“legislature”) took action by enacting NMSA 1978, Section 72-29.1(A) (2003).27 In an attempt to address these concerns, the legislature
directed the State Engineer to “adopt rules for priority administration to
21. NMSA 1978, § 72-2-9.1 (2003) (mandating that the New Mexico Office of the
State Engineer adopt rules to efficiently administer water rights in priority).
22. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987). See also Chris Gorbach, New
Mexico’s Experience on the Pecos (Dec. 17, 2004), http://www.waterassembly.org/
archives/8th%20Assembly/New%20Mexico’s%20Eperience%20on%20the%20Pecos
.pdf (providing and general background of Pecos Compact compliance and that New
Mexico’s lesson from Texas v. New Mexico was that “compact compliance is not an
option—either we are going to figure it out, or there are nine judges in a big building
in Washington, D.C. that will do it for us.”), http://www.waterassembly.org/archives/
8th%20Assembly/New%20Mexico’s%20Eperience%20on%20the%20Pecos.pdf.
23. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 135 (1987).
24. See Richard Heim, U.S. Drought Monitor: West, UNITED STATES DROUGHT
MONITOR, (Nov. 19, 2013) (showing that at the end of 2000 about 20 percent of New
Mexico was experiencing some degree of drought compared to about 85 percent at
the end of 2003), http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/Home/StateDroughtMonitor.
aspx?NM.
25. Chris Gorbach, New Mexico’s Experience on the Pecos, MIDDLE RIO GRAND
WATER ASSEMBLY (2003), http://www.waterassembly.org/archives/8th%20Assembly/
New%20Mexico’s%20Eperience%20on%20the%20Pecos.pdf.
26. Water Rights Management, supra note 9, at 3 (recognizing that “[p]riority administration has the potential to pit cities and farmers against each other,” as one of
the potential tensions created when priority administration is used to regulate water
rights).
27. See NMSA 1978, § 72-2-9.1(A) (2003) (stating “[t]he legislature recognizes
that the adjudication process is slow, the need for water administration is urgent, compliance with interstate compacts is imperative and the state engineer has authority to
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ensure that authority is exercised: (1) so as not to interfere with a future
or pending adjudication; (2) so as to create no impairment of water rights,
other than what is required to enforce priorities; and (3) so as to create
no increased depletions.”28 This mandate permitted the State Engineer to
administer water rights within the state prior to a formal adjudication
process, effectively allowing a water right to be curtailed without an inter
se process.29
To accommodate the mandate, the State Engineer developed the
Active Water Resource Management regulations (“AWRM”).30 AWRM
gives the State Engineer authority to appoint water masters to unadjudicated districts that are identified to be in need of water management.31
Once a water district is identified and assigned a water master, the water
master has the authority to evaluate and delegate the supply of water
based on “administrable water rights.”32 Administrable water rights are
defined as “water right or right to impound, store or release water, the
elements of which have been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or determined on an interim basis by the state engineer under
these rules and regulations.”33
The State Engineer established a hierarchy of evidence to be considered in determining each user’s water right and date that the water right
was established.34 This hierarchy is structured to establish water rights
based on the best available evidence, ordered as follows: (A) a final decree from an adjudication,35 (B) a sub file order from an adjudication,36
(C) an offer of judgment from an adjudication, (D) a hydrographic sur-

administer water allocations in accordance with the water right priorities recorded
with or declared or otherwise available to the state engineer.”).
28. See NMSA 1978, § 72-2-9.1(B) (2003).
29. See Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n v. D’Antonio, 2012-NMSC039, ¶ 44, 289 P.3d 1232 (establishing that Tri-State’s belief that water rights were
prohibited from being curtailed until they have been adjudicated inter se was based on
the New Mexico Supreme Court’s holding in PVACD). See also State ex rel. Reynolds
v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 1983-NMSC-044, ¶ 6, 99 N.M. 699 (providing that there can be no administration of water rights until parties have been
provided opportunity to contest priorities through and inter se process).
30. See 19.25.13.1-50 NMAC.
31. See 19.25.13.11-12 NMAC (creating districts for water masters based on necessity). See also 19.25.13.16 NMAC (giving general authority to appointed water
masters).
32. See 19.25.13.17(H) NMAC (implementing authority for administration of
water deliveries according to priority). See also 19.25.12.16(B) NMAC.
33. 19.25.13.7(B) NMAC.
34. 19.25.13.27 NMAC.
35. See Adjudications, supra note 4, at 4-5.
36. See Adjudications, supra note 4, at 4-3.
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vey,37 (E) a license issued by the State Engineer, (F) a permit issued by
the State Engineer, and (G) a determination by the State Engineer using
“the best available evidence” of historic, beneficial use.38 After the water
master determines the administrable water rights, the dates are posted
and can be appealed through the State Engineer’s administrative appeals
process.39
AWRM’s hierarchy does not provide an inter se process and thus
effectively allows a water right to be curtailed without the previously integral process of determining the priority of water rights. The inter se process was also thought be protected by constitutional due process because
of the Court’s ruling in State, ex rel. Reynolds v. Pecos Valley Artesian
Conservancy District (“PVACD”).40
In response to the creation of AWRM, Tri-State Generation and
Transmission Association, Inc. (“Tri-State”) promptly challenged the regulations on separation of powers, statutory interpretation, due process,
and vagueness grounds.41 Tri-State claimed that the absence of the inter se
process before curtailing a water right provides the state engineer with an
adjudication power that properly belongs to the judiciary and thus violates separation of powers.42 Tri-State also claimed that by failing to provide an inter se process, AWRM strips water right holders of their
procedural due process rights.43
The district court reversed the State Engineer’s adoption of AWRM
regulations on separation of power grounds and held that AWRM violated Article III, Section I of the New Mexico Constitution because the
State Engineer did not have the appropriate power to enforce the priority
administration in AWRM.44 The district court found sections (D), (F), and
37. Adjudications, supra note 4, at 4-5 (explaining that the Office of the State
Engineer collects information about each water claim to a source to identify should be
joined as claimant in a case as well as to collect necessary information to make offers
of judgment to claimants).
38. See 19.25.13.27(A)-(G) NMAC. See also Adjudications, supra note 4, at 4-5.
39. See Adjudications, supra note 4, at 4-5.
40. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist.,1983NMSC-044, ¶ 6, 99 N.M. 699 (stating that “there can be no administration of junior
rights as against senior rights until the parties have had an opportunity to contest
priorities inter se.”).
41. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n v. D’Antonio, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶
7, 289 P.3d 1232.
42. Id. ¶ 33.
43. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 25, Tri-State Generation & Transmission
Ass’n v. D’Antonio, 2012-NMSC-039 (No. 32,704).
44. N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that “[t]he powers of the government of
this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and
judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers
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(G) (hydrographic survey, permit issue by the State Engineer, and determination by State Engineer respectively) of 19.25.13.27 NMAC unconstitutional because the State Engineer’s authority to determine priority
dates was limited to considering licenses and adjudications only.45 The
district court also determined that the appeals process for priority administration was too slow and violated state constitutional guarantees of due
process as well as New Mexico’s guarantee of an inter se process before
water rights are curtailed.46
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in
part and reversed in part. The court of appeals held that even if the Legislature intended to provide the authority for the State Engineer to adopt
the AWRM regulations being challenged, the necessary framework to
provide that authority was not present in NMSA § 72-2-9.1.47 The court of
appeals further restricted the sources the State Engineer could use to determine priority dates by ruling that in addition to sections (D), (F), and
(G), Sections (B) (sub-file orders), and (C) (offer of judgment) could not
be considered.48 The court of appeals reversed the district court’s finding
that the appeal procedures for priority determinations failed to satisfy
New Mexico’s due process requirements.49 The State Engineer then petitioned the supreme court where four issues, which are discussed in the
next section of this note, were considered on appeal.50
The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld NMSA § 72-2-9.1 and
AWRM in their entirety. Affirming in part and reversing in part, the
court held that the Legislature provided the necessary authority for the
State Engineer to promulgate AWRM and that the regulations were constitutional for purposes of due process, separation of powers, and
vagueness.51
III. RATIONALE
Part III discusses the New Mexico Supreme Court’s Tri-State Generation v. D’Antonio decision in four sections. Each section reflects an issue

properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any powers properly
belonging to either of the other .”).
45. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n., 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 7.
46. Id.
47. Id. ¶¶ 29-30.
48. See 19.25.13.27(B)-(C) NMAC.
49. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v. D’Antonio, 2011-NMCA015, ¶36, 149 N.M. 394.
50. See generally Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass’n., 2012-NMSC-039.
51. Id. ¶ 17.
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appealed to the court including: (1) statutory analysis, (2) separation of
powers, (3) due process, and (4) vagueness.
A. Statutory Interpretation
To determine whether § 72-2-9.1 provides appropriate authority to
the State Engineer the supreme court applied two canons of statutory
construction. First, the court analyzed the plain meaning of the language
of the statute.52 In doing so, the court considered the title of the enacting
legislation as an indication of legislative intent.53 Senate Bill 551, the enacting legislation for Section 72-2-9.1, was titled “An Act Relating to
Water; Providing Authority for State Engineer Priority Administration
and Expedited Water Marketing and Leasing.”54 The supreme court reasoned that the title was clear about the intent of the Legislature and proceeded to analyze the plain meaning of the word “provide” in the title
and determined that the Legislature intended to grant the State Engineer
new authority to carry out the new priority administration
responsibilities.55
Secondly, the supreme court addressed the absence of legislative
statutory direction as to placement in New Mexico’s statutory code. The
supreme court determined that the assigned placement of the legislation
by the New Mexico Compilation Commission after it was enacted does
not restrict the power granted to the State Engineer to the subject matter
in Section 72-2-9 simply because the statutory number assigned was 72-29.1.56 The court explained that there are times that placement can be
taken into consideration but that in the case at hand, the Legislature only
gave general instructions to enact a new section of Chapter 72 NMSA
1978.57 The court reasoned that the instruction of the Legislature to create
a new section also supports the plain meaning of the enacting legislation’s
title.58 Ultimately, and contrary to the court of appeals, the supreme court
provided a great deal of deference to the Legislature when conducting a
statutory analysis of § 72-2-9.1.

52. Id. ¶ 18.
53. Id.
54. 2003 N.M. Laws, ch. 63 § 1. See Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n.,
2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 19.
55. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n., 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 20.
56. Id. ¶¶ 21-26.
57. Id. ¶¶ 21-23.
58. Id. ¶ 25.
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B. Separation of Powers
Next, the supreme court rejected Tri-State’s claim that AWRM is
unconstitutional on the grounds that the New Mexico Constitution provides that water priorities must be determined only after an inter se adjudication in a court.59 Upholding the court of appeals, the supreme court
determined that the New Mexico Constitution does not indicate that all
elements of determining water rights are the exclusive responsibility of
the judicial branch.60 Tri-State’s argument relied on language from the
supreme court’s decision in PVACD, which required an inter se process
before any administration of junior rights against senior rights.61 The supreme court distinguished the rule in PVACD and made clear that the
PVACD holding deals exclusively with an adjudication statute and is
therefore inapplicable in Tri-State because §72-2-9.1 addresses priority
administration before the adjudication process begins.62 Put another way,
PVACD articulates that an inter-se process is required before the priority
administration of water rights can occur within the adjudication process,
but § 72-2-9.1 and AWRM fall outside of the PVACD scope because
AWRM’s primary purpose is to address the priority administration of
water outside of the formal adjudication process. The distinction the Supreme Court made between PVACD and § 72-2-9.1 resolved the claim
that the State Engineer was given adjudicative authority that rightfully
belongs to the court because the authority the statute provides is authority to administer rights completely outside of and before the formal adjudication process.63 The court then went one step further in supporting its
rejection of Tri-State’s argument that AWRM violates separation of powers by illustrating the New Mexico Supreme Court’s long standing support for allowing the Legislature to vest agencies with rule-making and
quasi-judicial authority.64
C. Due Process
Third, the supreme court used a two-step analysis to address TriState’s claim that they were deprived of a water right without due pro-

59. Id. ¶ 27.
60. Id.
61. Id. ¶ 28 (providing “[t]here can be no administration of junior rights as against
senior rights until the parties have had an opportunity to contest priorities inter se”
(quoting State ex rel. Reynolds v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 1983NMSC-044, ¶ 6, 99 N.M. 699)).
62. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n., 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 31.
63. Id. ¶ 32.
64. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v. D’Antonio, 2011-NMCA015, ¶ 35, 149 N.M. 394.
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cess.65 The court rejected Tri-State’s claim by invoking the Public Trust
doctrine, which allows water rights to be reallocated at the government’s
discretion without being considered a taking.66 Under the Public Trust
doctrine, a water right is incapable of being entirely owned by an individual but rather is owned by the public, and individuals are only afforded a
right to use a certain amount of water as long as there is no greater public
interest in the water.67 The supreme court explained that water rights are
regulated by the state, and in New Mexico the water is governed by the
prior appropriation doctrine, which states “priority of appropriation will
give to the better right[.]”68 This language within the N.M. Constitution
indicates that the ultimate owner of all of the water within the state is
actually the state, which then authorizes the right to use to water beneficially.69 After explaining that New Mexico water rights are usufructuary70
in nature, the supreme court explained that when a water right is deprived due to limited resources, the regulation does not constitute a confiscation of the right, only an administration based on priority that is
supported and mandated by the N.M. Constitution.71 The supreme court
recognized the sobering realities of operating under the prior appropriation doctrine but established that when junior rights are curtailed to accommodate the rights of senior users or the public, a junior user does not
have a guarantee of adjudication prior to the deprivation.72 The court further explained that a water right was nothing more than permission from
the State to use the water as long as there was not a more pressing and
beneficial use for that water that better serves the interest of the public.73
Additionally, the supreme court held that Tri-State’s claim that the
appeals process set forth by AWRM was unconstitutional, was not ripe.
65. Id. ¶ 38.
66. Doulas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Some
Realism About the Takings Issue, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 424 (1995) [hereinafter Western Water Rights] (explaining that the Public Trust Doctrine has developed into a took
to reallocate water from existing appropriations to trust uses without payment of just
compensation to the appropriators).
67. See Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n., 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 41.
68. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
69. Id.
70. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1684 (9th ed. 2009) (providing the definition as
“[a] right for a certain period to use and enjoy the fruits of another’s property without
damaging or diminishing it, but allowing for any natural deterioration in the property
over time.”).
71. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n., 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 45. See Water
Rights Management, supra note 9, at 2 (explaining that beneficial use has never had a
static definition in New Mexico but is clear in that the term does not include waste).
72. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n., 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 45.
73. Id. ¶ 45.
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The court rejected Tri-State’s argument that the appeals process would
cause damage because Tri-State had not yet been subjected to a ruling
under AWRM or appealed an administration of water rights pursuant to
the State Engineer’s administrative appeals process set forth in AWRM.74
The Supreme Court ultimately found the appeals process constitutional.75
D. Vagueness
Finally, Tri-State argued that since a person of normal intelligence
would not be able to understand the hierarchy of evidence that the
AWRM takes into consideration in determining the priority of water
rights, the application of the hierarchy is so vague that it violates due
process.76 The supreme court rejected this claim and reasoned that where
no direct penalties are tied to the statute, the standards for vagueness are
more relaxed.77 The court further determined that the hierarchy (which
includes examples) adequately informs those who wish to be informed
what kind of evidence the State Engineer will take into consideration
when determining priority of water rights.78
In summary, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the AWRM
regulations by deferring to its interpretation of the legislature’s intent
when creating 72-2-9.1. After establishing the validity of the legislature’s
statutory mandate to the State Engineer, the supreme court held that the
AWRM regulations do not violate due process, as water ultimately belongs to the public and the state is under a duty to regulate water in a
manner consistent with the public interest at large. The court also found
that AWRM does not usurp the power of the judiciary, as the regulation
of water consistent with public interest is not an exclusive power of the
judiciary. Finally the Tri-State court ruled that the AWRM regulations
created by the State Engineer are not impermissibly vague, and that the
language of the regulations is sufficient to apprise an average individual
of the types of evidence the State Engineer will consider when administering water rights.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Three main issues were created when the Tri-State court invoked the
Public Trust doctrine as a means to grant the State Engineer authority to
curtail pre-adjudicated water rights and departed from the PVACD
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

¶
¶
¶
¶
¶

49.
50.
51.
57.
59-60.
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rule.79 First is the tension between the use of the Public Trust doctrine in
the Tri-State decision and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.80
Secondly, when the supreme court departed from PVACD and ruled that
an inter se process was not required before a pre-adjudication water right
could be curtailed, the court created the potential for out-of-priority administration of water rights. Even though the public interest that buttresses the Tri-State decision is compelling and may find shelter under the
Public Trust doctrine, the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause are ultimately eroded. An erosion of takings protections leaves
New Mexico’s water right holders with few options to be compensated for
losses suffered due to a curtailment of their water right, even if the curtailment suffered is wrongful and resulted in complete economic devastation. Lastly, a departure from the PVACD rule mandating that
individuals be afforded an inter se process may discourage the State Engineer from undertaking formal adjudications in a timely manner or at all.
These concerns arise from the increased potential for the State Engineer
to wrongfully curtail a water right under the alarmingly simple AWRM
regulations.
While the State of New Mexico may find protection under the Public Trust doctrine for the reallocation of water rights to serve the public
interest, significant constitutional concerns are raised when the State Engineer curtails a water right without an inter se process.81 A deprivation of
a water right without an inter se process almost certainly violates New
Mexico’s constitutional mandate that water be regulated by priority administration.82 Additionally, while the Public Trust doctrine generally provides protection to a state from the Takings Clause when a water right is
reallocated in the public interest, a reasonable argument exists that an
individual whose water right is wrongfully curtailed has the right to be
compensated. Ultimately this author concludes that the Public Trust doctrine provides the state with a way to serve the public interests by arming
the State Engineer with the necessary tools to comprehensively manage
the State’s water. However, by denying affected individuals an inter se
process, there will ultimately be violations of Section XVI of the N.M.

79. Id. ¶ 31.
80. Roderick E. Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context,
29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 585, 590 (1989) [hereinafter Public Trust Doctrine and Water]
(highlighting the tension between the Public Trust Doctrine and the Takings Clause
concerning water rights and how differing state laws may also create more or alleviate
that tension).
81. “Priority of appropriation shall give the better right.” N.M. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 2.
82. Id.
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Constitution that run counter to the protections afforded by the Takings
Clause of the United States Constitution. The New Mexico Supreme
Court should consider returning to the rule set forth in PVACD, which
requires an inter se process to be provided to a water right holder before
curtailment of that right can occur.
A. How Tri-State Creates Tension between the Public Trust Doctrine,
and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution
The Public Trust doctrine promotes the public interest, while the
Takings Clause serves to protect individual interests. These competing interests are weighed by the court in the Tri-State decision, and the implications of pitting public and private interests against each other in matters
of water regulation become clear.
i. Brief History of the Public Trust Doctrine
The complete history of the Public Trust doctrine is beyond the
scope of this paper but has been discussed in great detail in other works.83
The American judicial system has traditionally held that the Public Trust
doctrine limits a state’s administrative and legislative power to transfer
state owned lands under navigable waterways, the lands that are beneath
waterways, to individuals as wholly vested water rights.84 The Public Trust
doctrine has historically protected public interests such as fishing, water
navigation, and commerce.85 In the historical use of the Public Trust doctrine, states own the land under navigable water and when states transfer
such lands into private ownership, they violate the trust in navigable waters that the state holds in interest of the public.86 Consequently, it is established that any transfer of land to a private party that violates the
public trust is inherently revocable.87
While largely ignored until the 1960’s, the Public Trust doctrine has
seen a recent revival that has shifted its historical interpretation.88 In nat83. William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process Based
Constitutional Theory, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for A Substantive
Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 395-401; James Huffman, Avoiding the
Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and Reversed
Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171, 189-96 (1987) [hereinafter
Avoiding the Takings Clause].
84. Western Water Rights, supra note 66, at 423.
85. Avoiding the Takings Clause, supra note 83, at 192.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 189-190. See generally, Geoffrey R. Scott, The Expanding Public Trust
Doctrine: A Warning to Environmentalist And Policy Makes, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
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ural resource litigation throughout the 1960s and 1970s, courts discovered
that the guessing game of whether a state must compensate private parties, such as water rights holders, could often be completely avoided by
invoking the Public Trust doctrine.89 Litigators suing on behalf of the public used various legal theories to protect the environment and natural resources, but the Public Trust doctrine proved the most viable legal tool
for aiding comprehensive natural resource management.90 What was unclear from the doctrine’s traditional interpretation was whether the right
of the public to perpetually use such resources has any legal foundation
capable of preventing infringements on those rights.91 The modern trend
is shifting as courts have recently used the Public Trust doctrine to limit
the legislative and administrative power of states to authorize proprietary
rights to water.92
The Public Trust doctrine has generally been applied to cases involving disputes over tide lands or lands beneath navigable waters, but not to
state water rights claims.93 State water rights are usually governed by either the riparian doctrine or the prior appropriation doctrine.94 New Mexico is governed by the prior appropriation doctrine, which requires that a
water diversion be for a beneficial use of the diverted water.95 The Public
Trust doctrine was not held to affect riparian and appropriative water
rights until 1986 in the California case of National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court.96 In National Audubon Society, the California Superior
Court held that the Public Trust doctrine may compel the state to curtail
existing water appropriations that compromise the public interests in navigable water by balancing economic and environmental needs.97 However,
the court noted that the state could grant and regulate water in a manner
REV. 1 (1998-1999); Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) [hereinafter The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law].
89. The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 88.
90. Id. at 474 (suggesting that if “that doctrine is to provide a satisfactory tool, it
must meet three criteria; it must contain some concept of a legal right in the general
public, it must be enforceable against the government, and it must be capable of an
interpretation consistent with contemporary concerns for environmental quality”).
91. Id.
92. Western Water Rights, supra note 66, at 424.
93. Public Trust Doctrine and Water, supra note 80, at 586.
94. Id. (providing that “private landowners have property rights in water contiguous to their lands” under the riparian doctrine).
95. N.M CONST. art XVI, § 3.
96. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P. 2d 709, 728 (1983). See also
Roderick E. Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context, 29 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 585, 586 (1989).
97. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P. 2d at 728.
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contrary to the public interest if the economic need is so great as to outweigh the public’s environmental interest at stake.98 National Audubon
Society echoes the revocability principle regarding submerged lands and
perpetuates the notion that existing water appropriations do not prevent
water from later reallocation in the public interest.99
ii. Brief History of the Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects private
property from being taken for public use without just compensation.100
The Fifth Amendment was adopted in the Bill of Rights to protect against
fears of a tyrannical federal government.101 Initially, the Fifth Amendment limited only the federal government and not state governments.102 It
was not until after the Civil War when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted that the Fifth Amendment was applied to state governments.103
In 1978 the United State Supreme Court, due to the legal difficulty
in determining when a taking actually occurred, analyzed the Takings
Clause in Penn Central Transportation Corporation v. City of New
York.104 The Court in Penn Central developed a balancing test that must
be undertaken in each case to deal with distinct facts.105 The Court identified three factors to balance to determine whether a taking has occurred:
(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner; (2) the
extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct investment-backed
expectation; and (3) the character of the governmental action.106 The
Penn Central Court alluded to the fact that protecting public interest can
be a significant weight in the balancing test when it considers the physical
invasion of property as more problematic than merely adjusting the economic benefits derived from property.107
Since Penn Central laid out the balancing test for a taking, the Court
has carved out two types of regulatory takings that are not subject to that
balancing test. These exceptions are important because compensation de98. Id. at 727-28.
99. See generally id. at 728.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”).
101. Edward J. Sullivan, A Brief History of the Takings Clause, LAND USE LAW
(Nov. 19, 2013), http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/Articles/Brief_Hx_Taking.htm.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
105. Id. at 124. See generally Western Water Rights, supra note 66.
106. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
107. Id.
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terminations are not subject to an examination into whether the takings
advance an important public interest.108 The first exception to the balancing inquiry was set forth in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV
Corp., where the Court determined that permanent physical occupation
of the property by the government constitutes a taking.109 The Loretto
rule is significant because despite a compelling public interest and regardless of how minimal the economic impact suffered actually is, a permanent physical taking by the government “entertains a historically rooted
expectation of compensation[.]”110
The second exception is found in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, which held that when governmental action deprives a property
owner of all economic benefit of their property, the governmental action
is a taking whether or not a particular public interest is served.111 However, a pre-existing limitation on the property title may actually permit
the governmental action of altering the physical or economic benefit from
the property.112 If there are pre-existing limitations on the title to a property, then the owner is not entitled to compensation irrespective of how
crippling an intrusion by the government may be, unless the action taken
by the government goes beyond what the pre-existing limitation would
allow.113
iii. Tri-States Invocation of the Public Trust Doctrine Creates
Protection From Tradition Fifth Amendment Takings Protections.
The Public Trust doctrine has become a refuge from the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment through the assertion that governments
are the guardians of finite public resources.114 As guardians, governments
have a duty to protect these finite resources to ensure they are used in
accordance with public interests.115 Thus, private ownership is not considered to be deteriorated when the government asserts control over the
title to a resource or land under the Public Trust doctrine. The refuge
concept enshrined in the Public Trust doctrine creates an obvious tension
108. Western Water Rights, supra note 66, at 426.
109. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
110. Id. at 441.
111. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
112. Id. at 1028.
113. Id. at 1030.
114. See Bernard S. Cohen, The Constitution, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the
Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388, 388-89 n.5 (1970) (“The state as trustee for the
public cannot, by acquiescence, abandon the trust property or enable a diversion of it
to private ends different from the object for which the trust was created.”) (quoting
State v. Cleveland P.R.R., 113 N.E. 677, 682 (1916)).
115. Id.
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with the protections of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that just
compensation will be rendered when the Government forces individuals
to bear a public burden.116 The goal of takings jurisprudence is to avoid
placing too large of a burden on a disproportionate few to serve the
greater interest of the public.117 A look back at Lucas will shed more light
on the strain between the guarantee of just compensation and the refuge
from compensation that the Public Trust doctrine provides. In Lucas it
was suggested that the state had the right to limit the value of land with
exemption from takings principles.118 The Lucas Court, however, explained state impunity for limiting an individual’s economic benefit was
inconsistent with the assurance of just compensation to citizens in the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.119
The Tri-State court, however, embraces the rule of National Audubon Society and perpetuates dicta that encourage the use of the Public
Trust doctrine as a means of reallocating water rights in the interest of the
public.120 Tri-State established that the State Engineer has power to curtail
a water right without an inter se process pursuant to the Public Trust doctrine by holding “Tri-State offers no applicable support for its proposition

116. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (obligating the Government to comply with its constitutional obligation of paying petitioners just compensation for a loss suffered when the Government was the direct beneficiary). See also
Avoiding the Takings Clause, supra note 83, at 173 (suggesting that the trick behind
the Public Trust Doctrine in circumventing the constitutional mandate of just compensation is simple: “[r]ather than admitting that public action has affected a private
property right and then seeking to justify that effect as a legitimate exercise of the
police power, t[his] doctrine[ ] lead[s] to the conclusion that a private property right
never existed in the first place and thus nothing has been taken as a result of the
government action.”).
117. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (establishing a balancing test to determine to weigh the private loss against the pubic interest); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (establishing that when a governmental taking results in
a complete economic loss, just compensation is required); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhatten CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (establishing that when a property
owner suffers a permanent loss of the property due to a physical governmental intrusion, then the intrusion is a taking).
118. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29 (stating “ ‘[w]here permanent physical occupation’
of land is concerned, we have refused to allow the government to decree it anew
(without compensation), no matter how weighty the asserted ‘public interests’ involved . We believe similar treatment must be accorded confiscatory regulations, i.e.,
regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land: Any limitation so
severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation) .”).
119. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
120. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v. D’Antonio, 2012-NMSC039, ¶¶ 41-43, 289 P.3d 1232 (insinuating that merely regulating water in accordance
with seniority is not a confiscation of water).
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that water priorities can be managed by the State Engineer only after an
inter se adjudication[.]”121 By invoking the Public Trust doctrine, Tri-State
provides an avenue for the state to reallocate appropriated rights without
just compensation. Not only does this raise the question as to whether a
constitutional taking would occur under Loretto, Lucas, or Penn Central,
but whether it would transcend the protection of the Takings Clause if a
water right is wrongfully curtailed, by accident or on purpose. If a water
right were to be wrongfully curtailed, the Tri-State ruling provides the
state protection from the duty to compensate the owner. There is no
doubt that if these takings protections were to be invoked, a disproportionate burden of servitude to the public would be placed on the few
individuals who have water rights curtailed without an inter se process.122
The Tri-State court ultimately determines that an appropriative water
right must give way to the public interest even though the right was initially granted for private use.123 The imbalance of the burden raises questions as to whether this is the proper balance between public and private
interests.124
B. Tri-State’s Departure from PVACD Erodes Prior Appropriation
Protections
New Mexico delegates water in accordance with the prior appropriation doctrine, which historically emphasizes investment security.125 The
prior appropriation doctrine grants water rights to users chronologically
in the order the water was claimed.126 This doctrine provides security to
users by protecting investments to land, infrastructure, or other water dependent activities made in reliance on the water right. The doctrine also
provides incentive to develop and increase the economic benefits of

121. Id. ¶ 33.
122. Id. ¶ 49 (recognizing that consequences of the prior appropriation system includes the potential of crops failing and industries suffering).
123. Id. ¶ 41.
124. See English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County,
Cal., 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) (departing from Penn Central ruling and marking a possible shift in the interpretation of the takings when it ruled that even temporary takings
require compensation). See also Avoiding the Takings Clause, supra note 83, at 172-73
(explaining that uncertainty regarding how the U.S. Supreme Court will ultimately
decide to balance the burden between public and private interests in resources when
the cost of resource regulation is borne by an individual).
125. See Western Water Rights, supra note 66, at 426 (explaining that the emphasis
on the security of water rights within the prior appropriation doctrine provides assurance that water will not be deprived for the needs of those that come later and thus
encourages investment in water development projects).
126. Water Rights Management, supra note 9, at 2.
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land.127 In 1983, the United State Supreme Court highlighted the importance of the security provided by the prior appropriation doctrine in declining to unsettle existing appropriations.128 More interesting is New
Mexico’s recognition of the importance of security in water rights appropriation (also as recently as 1983) in the PVACD ruling.129
i. How Tri-State Weakens the Prior Appropriation Doctrine
The prior appropriation doctrine is the legal doctrine under which
water has been regulated in New Mexico for many years, and it promotes
“first in time” claims to water over those claimed later.130 Under the prior
appropriations doctrine, an individual possessing a water right is entitled
to continual use of that right so long as the use is beneficial.131 This guarantee encourages investment in economic development opportunities by
offering security against the loss of water rights.132 The prior appropriations doctrine’s encouragement to use water succeeded in allocating
much of the state’s water early on.133 However, limited water resources,
population growth, environmental concerns, and claims to water by
tribes, the federal government, and other states are now colliding with the
central purpose of the prior appropriations doctrine and chipping away at
the security it once provided.134 While the reasons behind this erosion are
compelling, the governing doctrine that contributed much to western economic development should not be cast aside.
A traditional element of the prior appropriations doctrine is the hierarchy for determining water rights it sets forth.135 The doctrine established that seniority of water rights was directly related to the earliest
identified beneficial use of that water. The primary benefit of senior

127. See Western Water Rights, supra note 66, at 461. See also Moyer v. Preston, 44
P. 845, 847 (1896) (providing that when land is unproductive due to arid and dry
climate, water can make land productive and that in order to promote land productivity, appropriated water rights should have “a security accorded to that right”).
128. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983) (“The doctrine of prior appropriation, the prevailing law in the Western States, is itself largely a product of the
compelling need for certainty in the holding and use of water rights.”).
129. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 1983NMSC-044, ¶ 6, 99 N.M. 699.
130. Reed D. Benson, Alive but Irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in
Today’s Western Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 675, 676-77 (2012).
131. Id. at 676.
132. Id. at 677.
133. Id. (explaining that many western rivers were fully appropriated by the early
twentieth century due to the principles behind the prior appropriation system).
134. Id. at 679.
135. Id. at 682.
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water rights is that during times of shortage, those with junior water
rights will suffer reductions or even a complete curtailment of their use
before the holder of a more senior water right.136 New Mexico operates
under the prior appropriations doctrine not only to establish water rights,
but also to regulate water rights.137 A problem occurs when an unadjudicated source of water is experiencing a shortage, as the state is left without a regulatory mechanism for the water rights during the shortage.138
This problem is addressed under the controversial AWRM regulations,
which authorized the State Engineer to temporarily regulate water by assigning a chronological order to water rights on a unadjudicated source of
water.139
Senior water rights traditionally offered a great deal of security to
their owners. Under AWRM, the State Engineer possesses the authority
to assign a chronological order to water rights without allowing negatively affected individuals to present evidence of their right’s seniority or
beneficial use before curtailment. The inability to present evidence of priority increases the potential for a wrongful curtailment and undermines
the ownership security traditionally provided by the prior appropriations
doctrine.140 Tri-State effectively opened the door to an erosion of New
Mexico’s constitutional mandate that waters of the state be subject to
appropriation in accordance with priority appropriation.141
The weakening effect of the Tri-State decision on the prior appropriations doctrine and can be seen in Bounds v. State of New Mexico.142 In
Bounds the supreme court held constitutional a statue in conflict with the
prior appropriations doctrine.143 In doing so, the court relied on Tri-State
as authority to buttress the concept that water rights are not absolute and
depend on the availability of water.144 Bounds further relied on Tri-State
to solidify the assertion that individuals whose senior water rights are curtailed in the public interest cannot complain because the ultimate right to

136. Id. at 682-84.
137. NM CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
138. Benson, supra note 130, at 677.
139. 19.25.13.17(H) NMAC.
140. Benson, supra note 130, at 684 (providing that problems could arise when the
state tries to regulate water rights that pre date the state water code consistent with
the prior appropriations doctrine because “[w]here a person has actually and continuously applied water to a beneficial use, there is almost certainly a valid right, but its
priority date [is] undetermined.”).
141. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
142. 2013-NMSC-037, ¶ 31, 306 P. 3d 457.
143. Id. ¶ 1.
144. Id. ¶ 31.
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water is vested in the public.145 It is clear that the governing legal principles within the public appropriations doctrine are being diminished as
times, values, or public needs change and become more diverse. What is
not clear is whether ignoring New Mexico’s foundational principles will
discourage economic investments that rely on the availability and enforceability of water rights. More importantly, our courts still must decide
whether curtailments made under AWRM will be upheld under the Public Trust doctrine or nullified by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
ii. Potential Impact of Tri-State’s Departure From PVACD
In PVACD, the supreme court expressly held, “there can be no administration of junior water rights as against senior right until the parties
have had an opportunity to contest priorities inter se.”146 The inter se process allows individuals to challenge each other’s rights with all documentation relevant to the date a water right was established.147 This is
important because there are water rights that pre-date records available
to the State Engineer.148 An individual that has a right that was vested
prior to 1907 is under no requirement to record the water right with the
State Engineer leaving the State Engineer without access to that information unless the individual chooses to place it on file with the State Engineer.149 This means that by determining the priority of rights before an
inter se process occurs, the State Engineer could potentially make a priority determination without considering all the relevant information. The
importance of a water right holder having an opportunity to present documentation that establishes the seniority of the right before curtailment
cannot be denied when a curtailment could equate to complete economic
devastation.150 Simply stated, a priority determination by the State Engineer made without all relevant and necessary documentation could violate the constitutional mandate of priority administration.151 AWRM and

145. Id.
146. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 1983NMSC-044, ¶ 6, 99 N.M. 699.
147. Water Rights Management, supra note 9, at 8.
148. Water Rights Management, supra note 9, at 2 (providing that New Mexico’s
water code was not enacted until 1907, and it was only after the enactment of the
water code that a permit became the only way to obtain a new water appropriation).
149. NMSA 1978, § 72-2-9.1 (2003).
150. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v. D’Antonio, 2012-NMSC039, ¶49, 289 P.3d 1232 (recognizing that consequences of the prior appropriation
system includes the potential of crops failing and industries suffering).
151. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
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the supreme court’s holding in Tri-State appears to provide the State Engineer with authority to do just that.
Under the AWRM regulations being challenged in Tri-State, the
State Engineer is not under any obligation to seek documentation outside
that of which is present in the office when compiling a chronological list
of priority determinations.152 Once the State Engineer compiles a chronological ordering of water rights, he publishes the list in the relevant newspaper for two consecutive weeks as notice to the affected water right
holders.153 In contrast, under the historic adjudication process, where the
inter se process is guaranteed, the Attorney General files a notice of adjudication.154 Upon that filing, all water rights claimants that can be discovered with reasonable diligence, are brought into the suit as parties to the
adjudication.155 Once a party has been brought in as a party, each claim to
a water right is litigated or otherwise resolved against all others inter se.156
The AWRM regulations offer no such protections a reality that raises serious concerns for water right holders.
C. How Tri-State’s Departure from the Public Trust Doctrine and
PVACD Creates Tension with The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause
The historic security for water users provided by the prior appropriation system is eroded by the potential curtailment of water rights before
an inter se process under AWRM and creates a clear tension between the
Public Trust doctrine and the Takings Clause.157 The AWRM regulations
upheld in Tri-State (when combined with the protection from the Takings
Clause under the Public Trust doctrine) effectuate a legal tool that provides the State Engineer protection in the event water is regulated, either
purposefully or accidentally, in violation of the New Mexico Constitution’s mandate for priority administration.158 Further, by providing the
State Engineer with a frighteningly simple process by which to prioritize
water until a proper adjudication process is completed, AWRM discour-

152. 19.25.13.27 NMAC.
153. 19.25.13.28 NMAC (providing “[t]he state engineer shall publish the adoption
or revision of administration date once a week for two consecutive weeks in two
newspapers of general circulation within the water master district affected by such
adoption or revision.”).
154. NMSA 1978, § 72-4-17 (1965).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Western Water Rights, supra note 66, at 432 (supporting the notion that states
that govern water rights by the priority rule and then deviate from that practice
“likely raise takings issue[s] involving matters of reasonable owner expectations”).
158. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
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ages the undertaking of the much more time and labor intensive adjudication process.
Once the State Engineer determines and implements priority dates,
there will be little incentive to go follow through with the formalities of a
judicial adjudication that would create a great deal more work. In a formal adjudication process, the State Engineer must locate all water uses
on a water source and provide the information to the Attorney General.
The Attorney General then sues on behalf of the state for the purpose of
determining all rights to use the water.159 Once claimants are brought into
the adjudication by the state, the State Engineer is ordered to provide a
complete hydrographic survey that contains all of the necessary data for
the determination of the rights involved in the suit.160 AWRM lacks such
obligations for the State Engineer and permits making priority determinations based on the information “on hand.”161 Also contrary to the formal adjudication process, AWRM places no requirement on the State
Engineer to locate water users causing increased chances of an erroneous
priority determination.162
Establishing an appropriate hierarchy of priority could become significantly less precise under AWRM. A misstatement of a water right due
to an oversight, incomplete data, or errors in data could all result in a
wrongful curtailment by the State Engineer.163 The AWRM regulations
provide the State Engineer with authority to regulate water without the
burdens of a judicial adjudication process, and arguably encourage a departure from undertaking new formal adjudications. After all, the State
Engineer need only “publish a list of his determinations of . . . water
rights” and decide on the date of administration (which effectively cuts
off junior users) to curtail a water right under AWRM.164 When the simplicity of the AWRM process is viewed next the complexities and burdens
of the judicial adjudication process, there is little incentive for the State
Engineer to initiate the adjudication process on a basin that has already
been subjected to AWRM determinations. AWRM changes the State Engineer’s role in the adjudication of water rights from being a party in a
lawsuit to being the ultimate decision maker as to the priority of water

159. NMSA 1978, § 72-4-15 (1907).
160. NMSA 1978, § 72-4-17 (1965).
161. See 19.25.13.27 NMAC. But see 19.25.13.27(G) NMAC (implying that there
may be field evidence of beneficial use, but fails to provide an obligation or mandate
to collect further information than what is already on hand).
162. NMSA 1978, § 72-4-17 (1965).
163. NM CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
164. 19.25.13.27-28 NMAC.
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rights.165 The question becomes, what incentive does the State Engineer
then have to pursue a formal adjudication once he has already made a
determination as to priority? The lack of an inter se process combined
with the absence of takings consequences serves as a disincentive to the
State Engineer to initiate formal judicial adjudications and may ultimately slow the adjudication process in New Mexico.
V. Conclusion
The Tri-State court holding that deference will be given to the Public
Trust doctrine ultimately serves as a detriment to private water rights.
Unlike traditional property, water rights are ordered chronologically, and
a junior right must be curtailed before a senior right. Ensuring that curtailments are performed in a manner that is consistent with the prior appropriations doctrine, as required by the New Mexico Constitution,
protects individuals from the grave implications of a wrongful curtailment. While there is a strong argument that reallocations of water rights
in the interest of the public should be afforded deference, the question
remains of whether that protection should be extended when the government was not obligated to obtain all relevant information before reallocations were performed. The effect of these misallocations would be a
violation of the New Mexico Constitution. Ultimately, Tri-State creates
confusion for water right holders in their investments that rely on water.
For this reason, substantial consideration should be given to the issue of
whether a wrongful reallocation of a senior water right violates the protections of the Fifth Amendment Takings clause.
Water reallocations within the state of New Mexico are periodically
necessary, and our Legislature appropriately delegated authority to the
State Engineer to oversee water regulations. However, this author encourages taking a deeper look at the private interest also at stake in the
world of water rights and advocates for the return to the PVACD rule. At
minimum, the State must create a process that allows for the accurate and
appropriate determination of water rights and remains consistent with the
prior appropriation tradition New Mexico has thrived under. “To the extent that we believe that private decisions will optimize the social benefits
we can derive from our scarce resources, we should be concerned about
judicial doctrines which alter private rights with impunity.”166 As demon-

165. 19.25.13.6 NMAC.
166. Avoiding the Takings Clause, supra note 83, at 210.
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strated here, the Public Trust doctrine has become a tool of circumvention that allows states to reallocate private property and water rights
without regard to the Fifth Amendment.167

167. Id.
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